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I. INTRODUCTION
Tired, scared, and overwhelmed – this is how two-year-old
Fernanda must have felt when she and her mother finally arrived
at the United States border.1 Wearing a pink parka and matching
*Megan Moleski, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. I would
like to thank the small village that helped me write this paper. I could not have
done this without the unwavering support and encouragement from my family,
husband, Bryce Sakach, and Staff Editor, Stephanie Glassberg. I would also
like to thank my former colleagues at Brigham & Women’s Hospital for bringing
me into the world of visas and immigration and ultimately sparking my desire
to go to law school and practice immigration law.
1.
Fernanda
is
a
Dreamer,
DREAMER
STORIES,
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pants, Fernanda clung to her mother for security.2 They were
undocumented immigrants who had just made the perilous journey
from Mexico to the United States; they carried their worldly
possessions in a single bag.3 Saying goodbye to their family in
Mexico, they set their sights on Alabama, where Fernanda’s father
was waiting for them.4 Little Fernanda was starting a better and
safer life with her parents.5 This journey to a new life in the United
States is one millions of children from around the world have made.6
Fernanda’s parents concluded that Mexico was no longer a safe
place to live after Fernanda’s father had been assaulted five times
and had his wedding band stolen twice.7 Her parents decided to
move to America to give Fernanda the opportunities she deserved.8
Since arriving to the United States, Fernanda and her family have
achieved amazing success.9 Her parents started four businesses
which created jobs in their community, purchased two cars, and put
Fernanda through college.10
However inspiring, Fernanda’s story is not unique. Scores of
children have been brought to the United States at a young age
because their parents wanted them to live a happy, safe, and
successful life.11 The United States of America would not be the
nation it is today without immigration.12 This is a nation of
www.dreamerstories.com/project/fernanda-is-a-dreamer
[perma.cc/U58AYM39] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
Child
Migration,
UNICEF
DATA
(April
2020),
www.data.unicef.org/topic/child-migration-and-displacement/migration/
[perma.cc/BQ7Z-ZYRB]; Immigrant Children, CHILD TRENDS (Dec. 28, 2018),
www.childtrends.org/indicators/immigrant-children [perma.cc/G82U-VN7K].
In 2017, fifty-four percent of immigrant children in the U.S. were of Hispanic
origin, while sixteen percent were non-Hispanic White, nine percent were nonHispanic Black, and seventeen percent were non-Hispanic Asian. Id. According
to UNICEF, in 2019, the United States accounted for the largest number of child
migrants at 3.5 million out of the 33 million children world-wide. Child
Migration, supra.
7. Fernanda is a Dreamer, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Immigrant Children, supra note 6. By 2017, 19.6 million children, or one
in four of all U.S. children, were immigrants. Id. While 16.7 million of these
children are second-generation immigrants, meaning they were born in the
United States to immigrant parents, 2.9 million of these children are first
generation immigrants. Id. These first-generation children were born outside of
the United States and later emigrated to the U.S. Id.
12. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 454 (2d ed. 2015); A.W. Geiger, In
116th Congress, At Least 13% of Lawmakers are Immigrants or the Children of
Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2019), www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/01/24/in-116th-congress-at-least-13-of-lawmakers-are-immigrants-
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immigrants.13 No matter who you are or how long your family has
been here, most Americans can trace their roots back to a brave
ancestor who risked everything for a chance at a better life.14 Sure,
some people emigrate for the excitement of a new location and new
adventures, but the vast majority of people who emigrate to the
United States are doing so out of necessity.15 It is not always
practical, or even possible, for every immigrant to go through the
normal channels of the American immigration system prior to their
arrival.16
or-the-children-of-immigrants/ [perma.cc/GJ47-2KRQ]. America’s Founding
Fathers created a generally pro-immigrant Constitution and system of
government. AMAR, supra, at 454. In fact, immigrants played a large role in the
founding of our nation and were key figures throughout our early government.
Id. “Seven of the thirty-nine signers of the Constitution . . . were foreign-born,
as were countless thousands of the voters who helped ratify the Constitution . .
. Immigrants accounted for eight of America’s first eighty-one congressmen,
three of our first ten Supreme Court justices, four of our first six secretaries of
the treasury, and one of our first three secretaries of war.” Id. More recently, in
2019, fifty-two members of the House of Representatives and sixteen Senators
were either immigrants or children of immigrants. Geiger, supra.
13. Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Aug. 20, 2020), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findingsabout-u-s-immigrants/ [perma.cc/N7PX-U29B]. More than one million
immigrants arrive to the United States each year. Id. Over forty million people
living in the United States today were born in another country; immigrants
currently account for 13.7 percent of the nation’s population. Id.
14.
Emma
Lazarus,
The New Colossus, POETRY FOUND.,
www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus
[perma.cc/TSC7PDDG] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020). “Give me your tired, your poor, your
huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming
shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the
golden door!” Id.
15. Nadwa Mossaad, Refugees and Asylees: 2018, OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS.
FOR
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY
1
(Oct.
2019),
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2018/refugees_asylees_2018.pdf [perma.cc/KKG6-TE7U]. In
2018, the United States granted 22,405 individuals refugee status and 38,687
individuals were granted asylum. Id. The number of admitted refugees dropped
from 84,988 in 2016, while the number of people granted asylum increased from
20,362 in 2016. Id. at 2, 8. To obtain either status, the individual must be unable
or unwilling to return to their home country while also being unable or
unwilling to avail themselves to the protection of their home country either due
to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Id. at 1. The primary difference between refugees and asylees is that
refugees apply for status outside of the United States, while asylum-seekers are
either already in the United States or apply for asylum when they reach a port
of entry. Id.
16. Why Don’t Immigrants Apply for Citizenship?: There is No Line for Many
Unauthorized Immigrants, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 25, 2019),
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/why-don’t-they-just-get-line
[perma.cc/NJ8J-Q9LW]. The vast majority of unauthorized immigrants have no
path for obtaining legal status once they have illegally entered the country. Id.
In general, there are only three pathways to obtain legal status under the
current U.S. immigration system: through employment, family reunification, or
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Since America’s inception, parents from all over the world have
left their homelands and brought their children with them to the
United States.17 These children had little to no say in the matter.18
Dreamers, those protected under the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (“DACA”) program, are no different from the many
immigrants who have made their way to American shores with the
hope of a better life.19 These undocumented children have become
an integral part of our modern society. They are our teachers,
doctors, soldiers, caretakers, and even Pulitzer-prize winners.20
They are brave, hardworking, and educated individuals who love
America and want to continue living their lives in the only country
they have ever truly called home.21
DACA grants undocumented individuals who came to the
United States as minors and are upstanding individuals, a two-year
forbearance from deportation proceedings and the opportunity to
work legally.22 Many people oppose this program.23 This opposition
humanitarian protection. Id. Many immigrants do not meet any of these
categories and regardless of how long they have been in the U.S. or whether
they are upstanding, law-abiding individuals, they will never be able to obtain
legal status. Id. Additionally, certain countries like Mexico, China, India, and
the Philippines, whose citizens make up the largest numbers of emigrants, often
have to wait anywhere from 10-20 years in order to be granted legal residency
if they apply “the right way.” Id. In other words, these individuals would have
to apply for status prior to entering the U.S., and then wait in their home
countries for decades before they will ever find out if they have been granted
legal status. Id.
17. Legal Immigration to the United States, 1820-Present, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST.,
www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us-immigration-trends
[perma.cc/KQ4F-LSFG] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
18. AMAR, supra note 12, at 455 (quoting former Michigan Governor
Jennifer Granholm, who emigrated to the U.S. from Canada, “You can’t choose
where you are born, but you can choose where you live and where you swear
your allegiance.”).
19. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, Alejandro
Mayorkas, and John Morton, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2012),
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [perma.cc/3GYL-P3BL].
20. Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration
Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 109-10 (2013). Gaby Pacheco arrived
in the United States at the age of seven. Id. She was an excellent student and
talented athlete. Id. She took part in her high school’s ROTC program and has
been an active equal rights proponent since her time in college. Id. Yves Gomes
was brought to America by his parents when he was just fourteen months old.
Id. at 110. He excelled in school, was an active member in his local church, and
is a caregiver for his cousin, who suffers from muscular dystrophy. Id. Jose
Antonio Vargas came to the United States from the Philippines and won a
Pulitzer Prize for his work in journalism. Id.
21. Id. at 111 (“I grew up here. This is my home. Yet even though I think of
myself as an American and consider America my country, my country doesn’t
think of me as one of its own.”).
22. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
23. Hans A. von Spakovsky, DACA Is Not What Liberals Say It Is. Here Are
the
Facts,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Dec.
4,
2017),
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begs the question: is there something inherently wrong with DACA
that inspires debate and animosity amongst Americans?24 The
answer to that, as any good lawyer would tell you, is “it depends.”
DACA is not a perfect program and was not created through the
normal channels of bicameralism and presentment.25 In other
words, DACA was never passed into law by Congress; it came into
being through executive action.26 This has led to a continued debate
about the overall legality of the program.27 DACA, however, has
allowed over 700,000 upstanding members of our society to remain
in the United States and engage in our socio-economic system in a
meaningful way.28
Part II of this note is divided into four subsections. It will begin
by providing some information about the various federal agencies
involved in implementing U.S. immigration laws.29 The focus then
shifts to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and why each is relevant

www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/daca-not-what-the-democrats-sayit-here-are-the-facts [perma.cc/FG4C-QUHQ].
24. Are DACA and the DREAM Act Good for America?, PROCON (July 19,
2021),
www.procon.org/headlines/are-daca-and-the-dream-act-good-foramerica/#10 [perma.cc/C5G2-H69D].
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3; Immigration & Naturalization Service
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-49 (1983). “Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States . . . Every Order, Resolution, or
Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary . . . shall be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. “The President’s role in the lawmaking process . . .
reflects the Framers’ careful efforts to check whatever propensity a particular
Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered
measures . . . By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence
of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers
reemphasized their belief . . . that legislation should not be enacted unless it
has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.”
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947-49.
26. See id. (explaining how the Framer’s created a system of bicameralism
and presentment to pass legislation); Memorandum from Janet Napolitano,
supra note 19.
27. Louis W. Fisher, Executive Enforcement Discretion and the Separation
of Powers: A Case Study on the Constitutionality of DACA and DAPA, 120 W.
VA. L. REV. 131, 132, 135-36, 158-60, 162 (2017); accord Lauren Gilbert,
Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration
Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 260-61 (2013) (describing the conservative
backlash after DACA was announced and the flurry of litigation immediately
after its implementation contesting DACA’s legality).
28. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct.
(1891), (1898) (2020) (“[B]y virtue of receiving deferred action, the 700,000
DACA recipients may request work authorization and are eligible for Social
Security and Medicare.”).
29. Operational and Support Components, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components
[perma.cc/JVP2-PM3V]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
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in this context.30 This section addresses the important interrelation
between administrative agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”), and the checks and balances put in
place under the APA.31 It also looks at the specific limitations within
the INA that DHS raised as a bar for judicial review.32 Next, some
background on DACA will be given: what it is, how it came into
being, and how it has positively impacted the lives of thousands of
undocumented immigrants.33 Additionally, a cursory overview of
the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program will be useful for
understanding why DHS chose to rescind DACA in 2017.34 Finally,
Part II concludes with a brief overview of the procedural history
leading up to Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of
California (“Regents”) and discusses some of the key arguments
made before the Supreme Court.35
Part III turns to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Regents, what
the decision means on its face, and what it might mean for the
future of DACA.36 Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion
about how to improve the DACA program so that it can provide a
sustainable, long-term solution for current and future Dreamers
while also pleasing DACA’s opponents.37 The Supreme Court’s
ruling in Regents demonstrated how precarious DACA’s status is,
and the importance of creating a permanent program to protect
Dreamers. A long-term, viable solution can be found by
implementing and adapting the current DACA program into
statutory law that provides a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers.

30. 5 U.C.S. §§ 101-505; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2021).
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105, 704, 706 (2021).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), (g) (2021).
With respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1), the
following requirements apply . . . Judicial review of all questions of law
and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and
statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter
shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction . . . to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.
33. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19 (describing the
benefits Dreamers enjoy through DACA, namely a forebearance on deportation
proceedings and the ability to work legally); Andorra Bruno, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44764, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): Frequently
Asked Questions (Sept. 6, 2017), sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R44764.pdf
[perma.cc/8UBD-H9AT]; Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. (1891);
FAQ: DACA and Dreamers, FWD.US, www.fwd.us/daca-101/ [perma.cc/9NSGF8UB] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
34. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. (1891); Texas v. United
States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (2015).
35. Id.
36. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. (1891), 1905-16.
37. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
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II. BACKGROUND
This case note discusses a variety of topics that are important
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Regents. This section will offer
background information on relevant federal agencies and laws and
will explain how DACA is involved in this lawsuit. Subsection A will
begin by providing a brief overview of the government agencies
involved in the U.S. immigration system.38 Subsection B will dive
into the APA and INA to explain why each is important to the
Supreme Court’s ruling.39 Subsection C will provide some
background information on DACA and DAPA.40 Finally, Subsection
D will provide a brief overview of the procedural history leading up
to Regents and some of the arguments made before the Supreme
Court.

A. Brief Overview of U.S. Immigration Agencies
There are a handful of important federal agencies involved in
Regents, so it is useful to briefly describe each one. Starting at the
“top,” there is the Department of Homeland Security.41 As part of
the executive branch of the United States government, it “secure[s]
the nation” and carries out federal immigration laws.42 Within
DHS, three agencies—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)—deal with
different aspects of the immigration system.43
Each agency plays a distinctive and essential role in the
enforcement of U.S. immigration laws.44 USCIS is in charge of
administering the laws and resolving immigration requests.45 This
agency reviews and decides visa and work authorization
applications, including DACA applications.46 ICE is responsible for
the criminal and civil enforcement of U.S. immigration laws.47

38. Operational and Support Components, supra note 29.
39. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2021); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2021)
(detailing the administrative procedures government agencies must follow and
the substantive immigration law DHS must apply).
40. Memorandum from Janet Napolitino, supra note 19; Memorandum from
Jeh Charles Johnson to León Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, and R. Gil
Kerlikowske (Nov. 20, 2014).
41. Operational and Support Components, supra note 29.
42. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2021).
43. Operational and Support Components, supra note 29.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS,,
www.uscis.gov/DACA#filingprocess
[perma.cc/92E4-Z268] (last updated Feb. 20, 2021).
47. Operational and Support Components, supra note 29.
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Imagine them as immigration police officers.48 ICE is typically
known for conducting raids to arrest undocumented immigrants so
that they can eventually be deported.49 Finally, CBP is responsible
for protecting the nation’s borders, enabling trade and travel, and
interviewing immigrants when they arrive at the United States
border.50

B. Why the APA & INA Matter
The aforementioned federal agencies must be governed by
something – this is where the APA and INA come into play. These
two statutes are central components in the Supreme Court’s
analysis and ultimate ruling in Regents. In short, the APA and INA
set out the rules that DHS must play by when executing the nation’s
immigration laws.51 The INA provides the substantive rules, and
the APA determines the procedural rules.
The INA is the federal statute that lays out our nation’s
immigration laws.52 It dictates what categories of visas are
available, what factors might prevent someone from obtaining
lawful status, what the path to citizenship requires, and whether
agency actions are reviewable by a court.53
In its legislative capacity, Congress is permitted to delegate
some of its authority to executive agencies.54 When Congress
delegates authority, it is recognizing that some matters are better
handled by experts.55 DHS is one such executive agency under the
48. See id. (explaining ICE’s role in the criminal and civil enforcement of
America’s immigration laws).
49. Worksite Immigration Raids, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CENT.,
www.nilc.org/issues/workersrights/worksite-raids/ [perma.cc/J9GA-Q7BY] (last
visited Jan. 2020).
50. Operational and Support Components, supra note 29.
51. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2021); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2021)
(providing the administrative procedures government agencies must follow and
the substantive immigration laws DHS must apply).
52. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2021).
53. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Gregory C. Ward, Lussier v. Maryland
Racing Commission: Maryland’s Court of Appeals Upholds a Fine Imposed by
an Administrative Agency Despite a Lack of Specific Authorization to Fine from
the General Assembly, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 515, 520-21 (1998). Article I, § 8, cl.
18 of the Constitution grants Congress the authority “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18. Through this Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress is allowed “to create
and empower administrative agencies.” Ward, supra.
55. See id. at 529-30 (explaining that because administrative agencies deal
with intricate issues in rapidly changing environments, experts in the field are
best suited to address these issues); D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws
and Rules Have Changed Through History, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015),
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-
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APA.56 While Congress maintains its legislative power to confer
rights to immigration status and pathways to citizenship, DHS
retains the authority to set policies “for the exercise of discretion
within the framework of the existing law.”57 However, under the
APA, federal agencies are required to engage in “reasoned
decisionmaking”58 and are “accountable to the public and their
actions subject to review by the courts.”59 In other words, the APA
acts as a check on agency action.60
In order to ensure administrative agencies like DHS do not
abuse their discretion, Congress must be able to place some sort of
check on the agency’s capabilities.61 Since DHS is accountable to the
APA through sections 101 and 105,62 any action it takes must align
with the provisions of the APA.63 Moreover, if DHS acts in violation
of the APA, its conduct may be judicially reviewable.64 Thus, when
the parties opposed to Duke’s recission of DACA (“Respondents”)
accused her of acting arbitrarily and capriciously in her decision,
section 706 of the APA was triggered.65 This provision allows a court
to set aside agency action if it violates the APA.66

C. The History of DACA & DAPA
For over two decades, Congress has failed to pass legislation

rules-have-changed-through-history/
[perma.cc/8SLB-FYHM].
“[M]any
governmental policy decisions involve intricate issues that are more aptly dealt
with by expert administrative agencies. This expertise is particularly necessary
in areas that evolve rapidly and require flexibility.” Ward, supra note 54.
Immigration law in the United States is constantly evolving and adapting to
global trends and threats, changes in our foreign relations, and changing
presidential policies. Cohn, supra. Thus, our nation is best served by experts in
the field who understand these developments and can build a flexible system.
Ward, supra note 54.
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105 (2021). “The Executive departments are . . . [t]he
Department of Homeland Security.” 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2021). “For the purpose of
this title, ‘Executive agency’ means an Executive department . . .” 5 U.S.C. §
105 (2021).
57. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
58. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015).
59. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
60. Id.
61. See Roni Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 27 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 2, 212-13 (2015) (noting that both Democrats
and Republicans wanted administrative law reform in order to maintain the
status quo and prevent administrative agencies from acting “on the basis of
unconstrainted discretion.”).
62. 5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105 (2021).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2021).
64. Id.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2021) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]”).
66. Id.
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that would protect undocumented immigrant youth.67 After an
unsuccessful attempt in 2000, Congress tried once more to pass the
DREAM Act in 2011.68 However, like before, its endeavor failed.69
In response to this deadlock, the Obama Administration decided to
take matters into their own hands pursuant to their enforcement
authority.70
Out of this gridlock, DACA was created.71 DACA is
encompassed in a two-and-a-half-page memorandum by the former
Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano (“DACA
Memorandum”).72 In this memorandum, Napolitano urged ICE,
USCIS, and CBP to use discretion when enforcing the INA against
young people who were brought to America as children.73 These
children are commonly referred to as Dreamers.74
In order to qualify for deferred action under DACA, the
applicant must meet certain criteria and pass a background check.75

67. Keyes, supra note 20, at 105.
68. Id., DREAM Act of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011). The DREAM
Act was first proposed in 2000, and since then has gone through many
iterations. Keyes, supra note 20, at 105. The DREAM Act is “[a] bill to authorize
the cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain alien students
who are long-term United States residents and who entered the United States
as children, and for other purposes.” Id.
69. Keyes, supra note 20, at 106.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note
19. “[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3. “It remains for the executive branch . . . to set forth policy
for the exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing law.”
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
71. Id.
72. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
73. Id. (“[T]hese individuals lacked the intent to violate the law and ongoing
review of pending removal cases is already offering administrative closure to
many of them . . . Our Nation’s immigration laws . . . are not designed to be
blindly enforced without consideration given to the individual circumstances of
each case. Nor are they designed to remove productive young people to countries
where they may not have lived or even speak the language. Indeed, many of
these young people have already contributed to our country in significant
ways.”).
74. Id.
75. Bruno, supra note 33; Misdemeanor Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019). The applicant must meet the following criteria: (1) entered the
United States under the age of sixteen; (2) under the age of thirty-one on the
date in which the memorandum was issued (June 15, 2012); (3) continuous
residence in the United States for at least five years prior to June 15, 2012; (4)
physical presence in the United States when the memorandum was issued and
when filing a request for consideration for deferred action; (5) must not already
have lawful immigration status as of June 15, 2012; (6) must not have a felony
record, been convicted of a significant misdemeanor, been convicted of three or
more misdemeanors, and must not pose a threat to public safety or national
security; (7) must either be in school, a high school graduate or previously
obtained a general education development certification (GED), or was
honorably discharged from the United States Military or Coast Guard; and (8)
the applicant must be at least fifteen years old when requesting deferred action
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Additionally, while not mentioned in the DACA Memorandum,
those applying for DACA must show that they do not meet the
criteria of a public charge.76 In other words, they must prove that
they will not be a burden on the U.S. government, nor will they
receive government subsidies, such as food stamps.77 If the
applicant meets all of these requirements, then either ICE or
USCIS may choose to issue a two-year forbearance from removal
proceedings.78 This means that a Dreamer will not be deported
during these two years.79 Additionally, those who are granted
deferred action under DACA may apply for work authorization,
which USCIS also grants at its discretion.80 As a result of DACA,
over 700,000 immigrants have been able to participate in our
society and economy without fear of deportation.81 These Dreamers
have started families,82 and make up 200,000 of our essential
under DACA. Bruno, supra note 33. A misdemeanor is a criminal offense which
is less severe than a felony. Misdemeanor Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary.
These offenses are sometimes referred to as minor crimes and are usually
punishable by “fine, penalty, forfeiture, or confinement.” Id. Somebody
convicted of a misdemeanor will typically be held in a county jail, as opposed to
a prison, for no longer than one year. Id. What classifies as a misdemeanor can
vary by jurisdiction; however, some examples of common misdemeanors are
perjury, battery, libel, conspiracy, driving with an expired license, and public
nuisance. Id.
76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A), (B)(i)(I)(II)(III)(IV)(V) (2021) (describing the
factors considered when determining if someone will be a public charge); CASA
de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 229, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2020). The INA
asserts that “[a]ny alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time
of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of
application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become
a public charge is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2021). The term
“public charge” has been part of the INA in some form since 1882 and Congress
has purposefully left the term undefined, leaving it to the discretion of the
executive branch. CASA de Md., Inc., 971 F.3d at 229. In its essence, the public
charge provision is tied to the non-citizen’s ability to be self-sufficient. Id. at
244. When determining whether a non-citizen would be a public charge, and
thus inadmissible, DHS is to consider their age, health, family status, assets,
resources, and financial status, as well as their level of education and their
skills. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(B)(i)(I)(II)(III)(IV)(V) (2021). Under the Trump
Administration, the Department of Homeland Security attempted to define
“public charge” as any “alien who [is] likely to receive certain public benefits,
including many cash and noncash benefits, for more than 12 months in the
aggregate over any 36-month period.” CASA de Md., Inc., 971 F.3d at 229. A
Fourth Circuit ruling found that while the executive branch retains “discretion
over the type, amount, and duration of public assistance,” public charge must
be read and interpreted according to its plain meaning – a public charge is one
who produces a money charge on the public for their support or care. Id. at 244.
77. Id.
78. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
79. Id.
80. Id. Recipients can renew their status and obtain an additional two-year
forbearance; thus, extending their DACA status all while never moving any
closer towards citizenship. Id.
81. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1896.
82. Id. at 1914 (“The consequences of the recission . . . would ‘radiate

1048

UIC Law Review

[54:1037

workers – 30,000 of which work in healthcare.83
While these undocumented youth have received protection
under DACA since 2012, undocumented parents of U.S. citizens or
lawful permanent residents were not able to receive the same
benefits.84 However, in 2014 DHS decided to establish DAPA—a
sister program to DACA—in an attempt to bridge this gap in the
immigration system.85 DAPA would have granted forbearance,
work authorization, and the same benefits DACA recipients receive,
to over 4.3 million undocumented parents of U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents.86 Ultimately, DAPA never got off the
ground.87

D. Background to Regents & Key Arguments Made to
the Supreme Court
Shortly after DAPA was announced in 2014, twenty-six states,
led by Texas, filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government seeking
to prevent the application of DAPA.88 These states argued that the
expansion of DACA to include DAPA violated the INA, APA, and
the Take Care Clause.89 After finding the states were likely to
outward’ to DACA recipients’ families, including their 200,000 U.S.-citizen
children . . . ”).
83. FAQ: DACA and Dreamers, FWD.US, www.fwd.us/daca-101/
[perma.cc/BB55-Q3D5] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
84. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson to León Rodriguez, Thomas S.
Winkowski, and R. Gil Kerlikowske (Nov. 20, 2014).
85. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1902-03; see also Fisher,
supra note 27, at 131 (explaining “In a 2014 memorandum, DHS launched
DAPA, which similarly extends consideration for deferred action to ‘individuals
who . . . have, [as of November 20, 2014], a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident’ and meet five additional criteria.’”).
86. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1902; Nicole Svjlenka,
What We Know About DACA Recipients in the United States, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS,
(Sept.
5,
2019),
www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/09/05/474177/knowdaca-recipients-united-states/ [perma.cc/HX5P-TJ73]. While this number may
seem incredibly high and might shock the conscious of those who are against
DACA, consider the economic and social benefits Dreamers have provided
because of DACA. Id. Their ability to work lawfully generates billions in taxes
paid to the government and allows them to pay into our social systems such as
Medicare and Social Security. Id.
87. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1903 (“[I]n June 2017,
following a change in Presidential administrations, DHS rescinded the DAPA
Memorandum.”).
88. Texas, 86 F.Supp.3d at 604.
89. Id. at 647; Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1902; 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b), (c) (2021); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. APA § 553(b) requires
administrative agencies to publish their proposed new rules in the Federal
Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2021). This notice informs government officials
about the public rule making proceeding, provides the legal basis for the
proposed rule, and gives a brief description of the rule. Id. After reviewing the
notice, government officials can submit their comments and arguments either
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succeed on at least one of these claims, the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas issued a nationwide injunction
preventing the implementation of DAPA.90 The government
eventually appealed this injunction to the Supreme Court; the
Court affirmed the injunction.91
After President Trump took office, DHS issued a memorandum
officially rescinding DAPA.92 Its reasons for ending DAPA were
threefold: the President’s stance on immigration, the injunction
preventing DAPA was still in force, and the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas’s injunction.93
Soon thereafter, former Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions
III received a letter from a number of states warning him that if
DHS did not rescind DACA by September 5, 2017, they would
challenge DACA’s legality in court.94 Attorney General Sessions
promptly sent a letter to Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Elaine C. Duke (“Duke”) urging an “orderly and efficient winddown” of the DACA program.95 Attorney General Sessions
concluded that “DACA shared the ‘same legal . . . defects that the
court recognized as to DAPA’ and was ‘likely’ to meet a similar
fate.”96 Consequently, on September 5, 2017, Duke issued a
memorandum terminating DACA and detailed how the program
would be wound down.97
in favor, or against, the proposed rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2021). The Take Care
Clause of the U.S. Constitution says that “[the President] shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. So essentially,
the states were arguing that they never had a chance to review or comment on
DAPA before DHS enacted the program. Texas, 86 F.Supp at 647. Therefore, by
allowing DAPA to come into force, the executive branch failed to ensure that
the laws were being followed faithfully. Id. at 607.
90. Id. at 677-78; Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1902 (“[The
United States and officials of DHS] have clearly legislated a substantive rule
without complying with the procedural requirements under the
Administrati[ve] Procedure Act . . . [T]his temporary injunction enjoins the
implementation of the DAPA program . . . It does not enjoin the previously
instituted 2012 DACA program except for the expansions created in the
November 20, 2014 DAPA Memorandum.”). Texas, 86 F. Supp. at 677-78.
91. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1902-03.
92. Id. at 1903.
93. Id.
94. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke to James W. McCament, Thomas D.
Homan, Kevin K. McAleenan, Joseph B. Maher, Ambassador James D. Nealon,
and Julie M. Kirchner, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017).
95. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1903.
96. Letter from Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III, to Acting
Secretary Duke, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017). Attorney
General Sessions determined “that DACA was effectuated by the [Obama]
administration through executive action, without proper statutory authority
and with no established end-date . . . Such an open-ended circumvention of
immigration laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the
[e]xecutive [b]ranch.” Id.
97. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1903 (“No new
applications would be accepted, but DHS would entertain applications for two-
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In a matter of days, individual DACA recipients, five states,
the Regents of the University of California, and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) each
challenged this rescission.98 They argued the rescission was
arbitrary and capricious in direct violation of the APA99 as well as
an infringement of the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.100 In two cases challenging the DACA rescission, the
District Courts found that an equal protection claim could be
brought against DHS.101 Accordingly, it issued a nationwide
injunction preventing DHS from rescinding DACA for the time
being.102
In the case brought by the NAACP, however, the D.C. District
Court gave DHS 90 days to reissue its rescission of DACA and
provide a deeper explanation of the legal grounds for Duke’s
rescission.103 This resulted in then-Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen
(“Nielsen”)
issuing
her
own
memorandum
(“Nielsen
Memorandum”).104 Nielsen “decline[d] to disturb” Duke’s rescission
and went on to provide three additional reasons why it was
appropriate to rescind DACA.105 Courts refused to consider the
Nielsen Memorandum because it did not sufficiently explain Duke’s
rescission.106 After a handful of appeals by the government, the
Supreme Court agreed to consolidate the remaining cases into the
Regents case and hear the parties’ arguments.107
In Regents, DHS attempted to argue that section 701(a)(2) of
year renewals from DACA recipients whose benefits were set to expire within
six months [of the issuance of this memorandum]. For all other DACA
recipients, previously issued grants of deferred action and work authorization
would not be revoked but would expire on their own terms, with no prospect for
renewal.”).
98. Id.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2021); Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct.
at 1905 (quoting in part Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]”. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (2021). When determining whether an agency action is arbitrary and
capricious, the court is “to assess only whether the decision was ‘based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment.’” Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
100. Id. at 1903; U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person] be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”).
101. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1904.
102. Id.
103. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Trump, 298
F.Supp.3d 209, 243 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2018).
104. Memorandum from Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
(June
22,
2018),
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DAC
A.pdf [perma.cc/56BC-A5AF].
105. Id.
106. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1904-05.
107. Id. at 1905.
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the APA prevented the Supreme Court from reviewing Duke’s
rescission.108 This provision is narrowly applied to the “rare
‘administrative
decision[s]
traditionally
left
to
agency
discretion.’”109 In other words, if Congress gives an agency the
ability to decide whether or not to take action in its field of
expertise, the courts cannot second-guess the agency’s decision.110
Included in this category is the agency’s decision to institute
enforcement proceedings against any particular individual.111 DHS
asserted that its decision not to enforce DACA was within its
discretion as an agency and, as such, the Supreme Court did not
have the authority to review its actions.112
However, DHS’s contention that DACA was a non-enforcement
policy fell flat.113 The Court aptly recognized that DACA “is not
simply a non-enforcement policy” – it is much more than that.114
The DACA Memorandum ordered USCIS to create and implement
a process for identifying individuals who meet DACA’s criteria.115
To that end, USCIS solicited and reviewed applications for
forbearance and work authorization under DACA.116 Bearing these
facts in mind, the Court determined that DACA was an “affirmative
immigration relief” program.117 Thus, DHS could not claim
protection under the APA, and the Supreme Court could review
Duke’s recission.118
DHS then attempted to use section 1252(b)(9) and (g) of the
INA to prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing Duke’s
rescission.119 The Court quickly did away with this argument by

108. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2021); Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Regents
of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. (1891) (2020). “This chapter applies,

according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that . . . agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2021).
109. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
110. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985).
111. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
112. Id. at 1906 (“[T]he Government submits that DACA is a nonenforcement policy and that its rescission is therefore unreviewable.”).
113. See id. (determining DACA is more than a non-enforcement policy and
as such, DHS’s recission may be reviewed).
114. Id. (quoting in part Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832) (“In short, the DACA
Memorandum does not announce a passive non-enforcement policy; it created a
program for conferring affirmative immigration relief. The creation of that
program – and its rescission – is an ‘action [that] provides a focus for judicial
review.’”).
115. Id.; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19 (asserting
“USCIS should establish a clear and efficient process for exercising
prosecutorial discretion . . . ”).
116. Id.; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19 (stating
“USCIS shall accept applications to determine whether these individuals
qualify for work authorization.”).
117. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
118. Id. at 1906-07.
119. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), (g) (2021).
With respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1), the
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finding the provisions were inapplicable to the issues in Regents.120
Sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g) apply in very limited situations.121
Under these provisions, a court is prohibited from reviewing any
action the agency has taken to institute removal proceedings or
deportation orders.122 Courts are also prohibited from hearing cases
that arise from the agency’s decision to deport a non-U.S. citizen.123
DHS was looking at Regents in the wrong light. The Court
noted that “[section] 1252(b)(9) ‘does not present a jurisdictional
bar’ where those bringing suit ‘are not asking for review of an order
of removal,’ ‘the decision . . . to seek removal,’ or ‘the process by
which . . . removability will be determined.’”124 This means a court
can review agency action so long as that action does not relate to
the agency’s decision to deport, the deportation process, or a specific
order by DHS that an individual should be deported.125 The
Respondents were attempting to challenge the sufficiency of Duke’s
explanation for revoking DACA, not a specific removal
proceeding.126 Therefore, the Court deemed section 1252(b)(9) was
inapplicable and as such, did not bar the Court’s review.127
Turning to section 1252(g), the Court found this provision
similarly inapplicable to the issues at hand.128 This provision is
limited to cases arising from removal proceedings or removal
orders.129 In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
the Court refused to accept the Government’s contention that this
section applies to “all claims arising from deportation proceedings,”

following requirements apply . . . Except as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) .
. . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on
behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.
120. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
121. Id. at 1907 (“Section 1252(b)(9) bars review of claims arising from
‘action[s]’ or ‘proceeding[s] brought to remove an alien’ . . . Section 1252(g) . . .
limits review of cases ‘arising from’ decisions ‘to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”).
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2021) (“Judicial review of all questions of law and
fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien
from the United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final
order . . . [N]o court shall have jurisdiction . . . to review such an order or such
questions of law or fact.”).
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2021) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
. . . to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien.”).
124. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1907 (quoting in part
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1910.
127. Id. at 1907.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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thus creating “a general jurisdictional limitation” on the courts.130
The Court was not going to deviate from this precedent.131 Since
Regents was not about a specific deportation proceeding or order,
the Court was not barred by this provision of the INA.132
The nuance is subtle but important. In rescinding DACA, DHS
was not instituting a removal proceeding, adjudicating a case for
removal, or executing a removal on any one specific person.133 What
it was doing was ending a program and its attendant benefits.134
While ending this program may eventually lead to some of these
actions, none were currently at issue.135 The question before the
Court was not about how Duke’s rescission impacted any one
Dreamer in particular; instead, it was about how Duke went about
rescinding DACA.136 Given this important distinction, the Court
found that none of the proposed bars to review—sections 701(a)(2),
1252(b)(9), or 1252(g)—prevented it from determining whether
Duke’s rescission was arbitrary and capricious.137 While DHS has a
wide range of discretion in its application and enforcement of the
INA, it does not have unbridled discretion.138 DHS must ensure its
actions conform to the current law.139
Regents provides a good illustration of why DACA’s status is
tenuous and why a long-term solution protecting Dreamers is
necessary. Given that DACA has yet to be codified,140 presidential
administrations remain free to alter or rescind the program at their
130. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482
(1999).
131. See Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1907 (rejecting
DHS’s suggestion that INA section 1252(g) covers any legal claim arising from
removal proceedings and therefore imposes a general jurisdictional bar to
judicial review).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1905 (“The dispute [before the Court] is . . . primarily about the
procedure the agency followed in [rescinding DACA].”).
137. Id.
138. Memorandum from Doris Messner to Regional Directors, District
Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, Regional and District Counsel, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE
(Nov.
17,
2000),
www.niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf [perma.cc/K6NS-RGKE]
(“Prosecutorial discretion can extend only up to the substantive and
jurisdictional limits of the law.”).
139. Id. (“[Prosecutorial discretion] can never justify an action that is illegal
under the substantive law pertaining to the conduct, or one that while legal in
other contexts, is not within the authority of the agency or officer taking it.”).
140.
Codify,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/codify [perma.cc/8FFT-AEND] (last visited Oct. 4,
2021); Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 995, 1000
(2012). “Codify” means “to reduce to a code.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra. In
practical terms, however, it essentially means “the law is on the books.”
Codifying laws helps clarify the status and application of the law – and clarity
promotes compliance. Meyer, supra.
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discretion and in accordance with their stance on immigration.141
The Supreme Court was able to save DACA in this case, but only
because Duke failed to follow the APA’s requirements.142 It is
entirely possible that a future presidential administration could
look at Regents as a guideline for how to successfully end the DACA
program.

III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
This section is divided into five subsections, each discussing
a particular Justice’s separate opinion. Subsection A will begin by
identifying and interpreting Chief Justice Roberts’s central
arguments in his plurality opinion.143 Beginning with a closer look
at whether DHS’s rescission of DACA is reviewable under the APA
or the INA.144 After addressing the issue of reviewability, the
analysis will shift to determine whether DHS acted in accordance
with the APA in rescinding DACA.145 Finally, ending with a brief
discussion as to Respondents’s Equal Protection claims.146
Subsection B will focus on Justice Sotomayor’s opinion and why she
believed Respondents’s Equal Protection Claim should have
survived review.147 Subsection C will look at the reasoning behind
Justice Thomas’s opinion, which Justices Alito and Gorsuch
joined.148 Subsection D will address Justice Alito’s brief separate
opinion.149 Finally, Subsection E will focus on why Justice
Kavanaugh felt the Court should have given due consideration to

141. Fisher, supra note 27, at 158.
There is a strong argument Congress has ‘de facto’ delegated the
authority to implement DAPA to the Executive by passing a ‘detailed’
immigration code that ‘makes a huge fraction of noncitizens deportable
at the option of the Executive.’ Even before DACA and DAPA were
implemented . . . this de facto delegation gave the President the power,
‘without having to resort to the legislative process, to alter significantly
the composition of the immigrant labor force, to permit immigrants with
minor criminal convictions to stay rather than removing them, and so
on.’
142. See generally Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. (1891)
(illustrating how DHS could have properly rescinded DACA if it had followed
the APA requirements).
143. Id. at 1907-16.
144. Id. at 1905-07; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2021); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9), (g)
(2021).
145. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1907-15; 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (2021).
146. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1915-16; U.S. CONST.
amend V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . ”).
147. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1916-18; U.S. CONST.
amend V.
148. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1918-31.
149. Id. at 1932.
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the Nielsen Memorandum.150
The fact that there are five distinct opinions on the issues of
DACA’s legality, reviewability, and equal protection should further
illustrate how complex and contentious this case was. This decision
did very little, if anything, to protect DACA long-term. The program
can still be rescinded at any time, Dreamers can still have their
status taken away, and they still have no pathway to citizenship. If
the United States truly wants to support Dreamers, Congress needs
to create legislation that protects them and provides them with a
pathway to citizenship.

A. Understanding the Plurality: What was Chief
Justice Roberts Talking About?
It is important to understand that the Supreme Court was not
determining the legality of DACA or if DHS was permitted to
rescind DACA.151 In fact, this case is more a study of administrative
law and procedure than anything else. Regents asked the Court to
determine three issues: (1) whether they had the authority to
evaluate the rescission of DACA; (2) whether DHS followed the APA
rules and procedures in rescinding DACA; and (3) whether DHS
adequately considered the impact this rescission would have on
Dreamers and their communities.152
1. Can the Supreme Court Review the Rescission of DACA?
Before determining whether the rescission was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA, the Court first had to determine
whether it could even review the issues before them.153 Chief Justice
Roberts began by explaining there is a general presumption of
reviewability when agency actions result in harm.154 This
presumption, however, can be refuted if “the ‘agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.’”155 What this means is if
actions taken by an agency have harmed an individual, then the
150. Id. at 1932-36.
151. Id. at 1905 (“The dispute before the Court is not whether DHS may
rescind DACA. All parties agree that it may.”); id. at 1910 (“[W]e do not evaluate
the claims challenging the explanation and correctness of [DHS’s] illegality
conclusion.”).
152. Id. at 1905 (“The issues raised here are (1) whether the APA claims are
reviewable, (2) if so, whether the rescission was arbitrary and capricious in
violation of the APA, and (3) whether the plaintiffs have stated an equal
protection claim.”).
153. Id. (“[B]efore determining whether the rescission was arbitrary and
capricious, [the Court] must first address the Government’s contentions that
DHS’s decision [to rescind DACA] is unreviewable under the APA and outside
this Court’s jurisdiction.”).
154. Id.
155. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2021).
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courts will typically be able to scrutinize this decision to determine
its appropriateness.156 With that said, if Congress has granted an
agency some discretion in its decision-making, then the action may
not be reviewed by the courts.157
DHS argued that this exception applied here because sections
701(a)(2) of the APA “precludes review of ‘agency action,’ not agency
‘reasons.’”158 Additionally, DHS’s “decision whether or not to enforce
the law [under the INA] is committed to the agency’s unreviewable
discretion.”159 According to DHS, DACA was really nothing more
than a non-enforcement policy whereby DHS had agreed not to
enforce the provisions of the INA against Dreamers.160 By
rescinding DACA, DHS argued it was actually “enforcing the law”161
because DACA was only meant to be a temporary fix.162 In other
words, DHS was claiming that it did not have to explain to the
public, or the Court, why it chose to rescind DACA.163 Moreover,
even if it did have to explain itself, the fact that DACA was a nonenforcement policy contrary to the INA was a more than sufficient
reason to rescind the program.164
However, Chief Justice Roberts quickly did away with this

156. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 828 (“Any person ‘adversely affected or aggrieved’
by agency action . . . including a ‘failure to act,’ is entitled to ‘judicial review
thereof,’ as long as the action is a ‘final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court.”).
157. Id. (“[B]efore any review [of the agency action] may be had, a party
must [prove that] (1) statutes [do not] preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is [not] committed to agency discretion by law.”).
158. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 7; Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 9, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California,
140 S. Ct. (1891) (2020) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) (“[I]f an action is
committed to an agency’s unreviewable discretion, then it doesn’t matter what
reason it gives for taking that action; it’s still unreviewable.”). Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra.
159. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 5.
160. Id. at 4-5.
161. Id. at 8; Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1906 (“[T]he
Government argues that the rescission of a non-enforcement policy is no
different – for purposes of reviewability – from the adoption of that policy. While
the recission may lead to increased enforcement, it does not, by itself, constitute
a particular enforcement action . . . [T]he Government submits that DACA is a
non-enforcement policy and that its rescission is therefore unreviewable.”).
162. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 5.
163. Id.
164. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2021); Bruno, supra note 33. DHS noted
in its oral argument that “DACA was a temporary stopgap measure” by which
“the Department agreed not to enforce the INA against hundreds of thousands
of illegal aliens.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 5. INA § 1227
speaks to the classes of non-citizens that are deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2021).
Specifically, INA § 1227(a)(1)(B) says that “[a]ny alien who is present in the
United States in violation of this [statute] or any other law of the United States
. . . is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2021). Because the vast majority of
Dreamers entered the United States illegally, they could qualify for deportation
under this provision. Bruno, supra note 33.
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argument by determining that DACA is much more than a nonenforcement policy.165 In coming to this conclusion, Chief Justice
Roberts looked at the DACA Memorandum itself.166 This
memorandum directed USCIS to take affirmative steps to
“establish a clear and efficient process” for identifying applicants
who meet the requirements for deferred action under DACA.167
Additionally, after this directive, USCIS began accepting
applications, reviewing their merits, and notifying applicants as to
whether they were granted the two-year forbearance from
deportation proceedings.168 Chief Justice Roberts found this
particularly important because it meant that DHS, through USCIS,
was providing affirmative immigration relief to Dreamers.169
Furthermore, the associated benefits that come with deferred action
offered additional evidence “that DACA is more than simply a nonenforcement policy.”170 Not only does DACA provide a two-year
forbearance from deportation proceedings, Dreamers are also able
to work legally and are eligible for social benefits, such as Medicare
and Social Security.171 Accordingly, because the plurality of the
Court found that DACA created an affirmative program of
immigration relief and was not just an agency policy of nonenforcement, the rescission of DACA was reviewable.172
Even though the APA did not prevent the Court from reviewing
the rescission, it still had to determine whether the INA prevented
review.173 DHS claimed that INA sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g)
provided separate bars for review since both provisions prohibit
judicial review of removal decisions.174 Chief Justice Roberts was
not convinced and pointed out the rescission of DACA did not
initiate any of the actions protected by these provisions.175
Since neither the APA nor the INA prevented the Court from
reviewing the recission of DACA, the next step was to determine
whether DHS abided by the APA procedures when it rescinded the
program.176 Principally, the Court had to determine whether DHS
165. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
166. Id.
167. Id.; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
168. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1907.
173. Id. (“The Government also invoked two jurisdictional provisions of the
INA as independent bars to review. Neither applies.”).
174. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), (g) (2021).
175. See id. (describing when judicial review of a decision to remove a noncitizen is appropriate). Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of these INA provisions
took up very little space in his overall opinion – encompassing only two short
paragraphs. Id. “The rescission, which revokes a deferred action program with
associated benefits, is not a decision to ‘commence proceedings,’ much less to
‘adjudicate’ a case or ‘execute’ a removal order.” Id.
176. Id.
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provided sufficient explanation for its recission and whether it
adequately considered Dreamers' reliance interests.177
There were two DHS memoranda, the Duke Memorandum and
the Nielsen Memorandum, before the Court that spoke to the
recission of DACA.178 In September 2017, Duke determined that
DACA should be rescinded for two reasons: (1) the Fifth Circuit had
ruled DAPA unlawful due to the benefits it conferred, and (2)
Attorney General Sessions concluded that DACA suffered from the
same legal defects as DAPA.179 In her memorandum, Nielsen
attempted to elaborate on Duke’s reasoning.180
During oral argument, Justice Breyer noted that a
foundational principle in administrative law is that “a court may
uphold agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked
when it took the action.”181 This means that DHS had to stay within
the explanations given in the initial Duke Memorandum.182 It could
not go back and add more reasons because that would constitute
post hoc rationalization (i.e. reasons given after the fact).183
Chief Justice Roberts noted that DHS either had to reissue the
memorandum rescinding DACA and provide further elaboration on
Duke’s reasoning, or start from scratch and “tak[e] new agency
action.”184 Since Nielsen chose to take the first route, the Court was
required to carefully scrutinize her memorandum “to ensure that
the rescission [was] not upheld on the basis of impermissible ‘post

177. Id. at 1907, 1913-16.
178. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 94; Memorandum from
Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104.
179. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910; Memorandum
from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104. Attorney General Sessions
determined “that DACA ‘was effectuated by the [Obama] administration
through executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no
established end-date . . . Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration
laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the [e]xecutive [b]ranch.’”
Id.
180. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104.
181. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 39.
182. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 94.
Taking into consideration the Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s
rulings in the ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017 letter from
the Attorney General, it is clear that the June 15, 2012 DACA program
should be terminated. In the exercise of my authority in establishing
national immigration policies and priorities . . . I hereby rescind the June
15, 2012 memorandum.
183. Post Hoc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 419. “Post hoc” means “after this” or “subsequently.” Post Hoc, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY. Thus, post hoc rationalizations would be reasons given after
something has already occurred. Id. Post hoc rationalizations are viewed
critically by courts and “have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis
for review . . . [as] they clearly do not constitute the ‘whole record’ compiled by
the agency . . . [which is] the basis for review required by . . . the Administrative
Procedure Act.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419.
184. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.
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hoc rationalization.’”185 DHS attempted to convince the Justices
that the Nielsen Memorandum was not a post hoc rationalization
because she was reiterating DHS’s official position on DACA.186
Rather, DHS contended that Nielsen was ratifying the decisions
laid out in the Duke Memorandum as the official position of the
agency.187 The Court did not see the Nielsen Memorandum in that
light.188 According to the elementary principle announced by Justice
Breyer, the Court had to look at the reasons given by DHS when it
first took action in September 2017.189
With this in mind, the Court determined that the Nielsen
Memorandum failed to elaborate on Duke’s initial reasoning.190 The
Court found that the Nielsen Memorandum bore little relationship
to the Duke Memorandum and actually “offered three ‘separate and
independently sufficient reasons’ for rescission.”191 This
determination amounted to the kiss of death for the Nielsen
Memorandum because it meant that she was providing
“impermissible ‘post hoc rationalization[s].’”192 Ultimately, Chief
Justice Roberts determined this was not the case to cut corners or
grant exceptions to foundational principles of agency law.193
Therefore, DHS was going to be held to the reasons given in the

185. Id.
186. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 40 (“It’s not a post hoc
rationalization. It’s the official position of the agency set forth by the agency
itself.”).
187. Id.
188. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.
Secretary Nielsen’s reasoning bears little relationship to that of her
predecessor. Acting Secretary Duke rested the rescission on the
conclusion that DACA is unlawful. Period . . . By contrast, Secretary
Nielsen’s new memorandum offered three ‘separate and independently
sufficient reasons’ for the rescission . . . only the first of which is the
conclusion that DACA is illegal.
189. Id. at 1908 (quoting in part Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (per
curiam)); see Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 94 (“When an
agency’s initial explanation ‘indicate[s] the determinative reason for the final
action taken,’ the agency may elaborate later on that reason (or reasons) but
may not provide new ones.”); Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at
1908.
190. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.
191. Id.; Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104.
First, as the Attorney General concluded, the DACA policy was contrary
to law . . . Second, regardless of whether the DACA policy is ultimately
illegal, it was appropriately rescinded by DHS because there are, at a
minimum, serious doubts about its legality . . . Third, regardless of
whether these concerns about the DACA policy render it illegal or legally
questionable, there are sound reasons of enforcement policy to rescind
the DACA policy.
192. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.
193. Id. at 1909-10 (“The basic rule here is clear: An agency must defend its
actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted. This is not the case for
cutting corners to allow DHS to rely upon reasons absent from its original
decision.”).

1060

UIC Law Review

[54:1037

Duke Memorandum.194
2. Was the Rescission Arbitrary & Capricious?
Once the Court determined it would review the Duke
Memorandum, the Court had to decide whether it was arbitrary and
capricious.195 While Respondents argued the Duke Memorandum
failed to adequately explain the agency’s conclusion that DACA was
illegal, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that Duke was actually
“bound by the Attorney General’s legal determination.”196 Under
section 1103(a)(1) of the INA,197 the Secretary of Homeland Security
(in this case, Duke), must treat all legal determinations made by
the Attorney General as controlling.198 Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged that Respondents did not address critical issues
related to section 1103(a)(1), and as such, the Court would not
consider them.199 This is important because it means that the Court
194. See id. (determining that DHS was going to have to defend Duke’s
original three reasons for rescinding DACA and Nielsen’s additional
justifications for rescission would not be considered by the Court).
195. Id. at 1910; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2021) (“The reviewing court shall . . .
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
. . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law[.]”).
196. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2021) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all
other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except
insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties
conferred upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the
officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers: Provided,
however, That determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to
all questions of law shall be controlling.”) (emphasis added).
198. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910.
199. Id.; Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activityresources/supreme-1 [perma.cc/7MGU-BY22] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020); Emily
Belz, High Court, High Costs, WORLD MAG. (Sept. 13, 2017),
www.wng.org/articles/high-court-high-costs-1618203551
[perma.cc/C97Q4RVW]. The Court said that Respondents failed to “discuss whether Duke was
required to explain a legal conclusion that was not hers to make.” Regents of the
Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910. Additionally, Respondents did not
“discuss whether the current suits challenging Duke’s rescission decision . . .
are proper vehicles for attacking the Attorney General’s legal conclusion.” Id.
Respondents’ failure to bring these arguments to the fore means that the
legality of DACA still remains in the balance, left to be determined on another
day. See Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910 (finding
Respondents failed to address legal issues regarding the impact of Attorney
General Sessions’s legal conclusions on Duke’s discretion in rescinding DACA).
With that said, it takes a lot of time, money, effort, and a bit of luck to bring a
case before the United States Supreme Court. Belz, supra. It is very possible
that the legality of DACA never makes it to the floor of the Supreme Court. See
Supreme Court Procedures, supra (explaining how each year the Supreme Court
only accepts one hundred to one hundred and fifty of the seven thousand cases
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was not going to determine the legality of DACA in this case.200 This
served as a double-edged sword because it meant the Court was not
going to support the rescission of DACA, but it also was not going
to affirm the program either.201
Instead, the Court focused its analysis on the question of
whether Duke “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the
problem” before her.202 In other words, did Duke adequately
consider differentiating between forbearance and DACA-related
benefits, and did she consider the reliance issues at stake prior to
issuing her rescission.203
Chief Justice Roberts looked at DACA as having two separate
components: the two-year forbearance from removal proceedings
and the benefits available to DACA recipients after they have been
granted forbearance.204 While former Attorney General Sessions
concluded that DACA suffered from the same legal defects as those
found in DAPA,205 he was silent on the forbearance aspect of
DACA.206 This was an important distinction for the Court because
Duke was aware that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on DAPA was
centered on benefits and not forbearance, yet she made no such
distinction in her rescission of DACA.207 Instead of differentiating
between two central aspects of DACA, the Duke Memorandum
“treated the Attorney General’s conclusion regarding the illegality
of benefits as sufficient to rescind both benefits and forbearance,
without explanation.”208
In conflating these two aspects of DACA and rescinding the
program in full, instead of limiting the rescission just to the related
benefits, the Court determined that the Duke Memorandum was
arbitrary and capricious.209 DHS argued that it was not obligated to
submitted for their review).
200. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910.
201. See id. (explaining how DACA’s legality is a legal issue for the Attorney
General to determine, but how to address the program’s potential illegality is a
policy choice within DHS’s authority).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1911. As a reminder, these benefits include work authorization
and the ability to benefit from Medicare and Social Security. Id.
205. Id. at 1911-12. The Fifth Circuit found that DAPA was contrary to the
INA because it conferred work authorization and public benefits to otherwise
removable individuals. Id. The focus of the Fifth Circuit’s decision was not on
DAPA’s forbearance policy, it was on the attendant benefits which would have
been available to DAPA recipients. Id.
206. Id. at 1912 (“[T]he Attorney General neither addressed the forbearance
policy at the heart of DACA nor compelled DHS to abandon that policy.”).
207. Id. at 1911-12 (“Secretary Duke recognized that the Fifth Circuit’s
holding addressed the benefits associated with DAPA . . . [However,] Duke did
not characterize the opinion as one about forbearance.”).
208. Id. at 1912.
209. See id. (finding “Thus, given DHS’s earlier judgment that forbearance
is ‘especially justified’ for ‘productive young people’ who were brought here as
children and ‘know only this country as home’ . . . the DACA Memorandum could
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separate these two aspects of DACA in its rescission and could
reasonably view the forbearance and benefits as “importantly
linked.”210 Nonetheless, the Court rejected this argument on the
grounds that there was no evidence to show that DHS ever
considered the possibility of separating the two aspects by only
rescinding the benefits portion of DACA.211
The Court found the Duke Memorandum arbitrary and
capricious not only because it rescinded the program in full but also
because it failed to address “whether there was ‘legitimate reliance’
on the DACA Memorandum.”212 Chief Justice Roberts noted that
agencies must take into consideration “serious reliance interests”
when they change course on a longstanding policy and that a failure
to do so would be arbitrary and capricious.213
Respondents and their amici pointed out that since DACA’s
inception in 2012, recipients have organized their lives around this
program and the forbearance and benefits it provides.214
Respondents argued that rescinding DACA would “radiate
outward” to Dreamers’ families and communities.215 Dreamers have
“enrolled in degree programs, embarked on careers, started
businesses, purchased homes, and even married and had children”
because they relied on DACA.216 Removing them from the work
force would result in the loss of billions of dollars in economic
activity and tax revenue.217 Respondents believed that these were
strong reliance interests that required attention and consideration
by DHS.218
While the Court agreed that these interests were “certainly
noteworthy,” they were not necessarily a deciding factor.219 Chief
Justice Roberts was clear that DHS retained the flexibility and
autonomy to rescind DACA in light of other policy interests which
might outweigh Dreamers’ reliance interests.220 However, DHS was
still required to consider these reliance interests,221 and the Court
not be rescinded in full ‘without any consideration whatsoever’ of a forbearanceonly policy.”).
210. Id. at 1913.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting in part Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117,
2126 (2016) (quoting in part FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009))).
214. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1914.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (“[E]xcluding DACA recipients from the lawful labor force may . . .
result in the loss of $215 billion in economic activity and an associated $60
billion in federal tax revenue over the next ten years . . . [Moreover], States and
local governments could lose $1.25 billion in tax revenue each year.”).
218. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 58-9.
219. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1914.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1915 (“[B]ecause DHS was ‘not writing on a blank slate,’ . . . it
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did not see the wind-down process in the Duke Memorandum as
sufficiently addressing Dreamers’ reliance interests.222 The only
purpose behind this process was to help the agency deal with the
“administrative complexities” of ending such an expansive
program.223 While agencies are not required to “explore ‘every
alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man,’”
Duke should have given these reliance interests their due weight
and considered alternative methods of winding down DACA.224
Ultimately, the Duke Memorandum failed under APA section
706(2)(A)225 because Duke did not consider the possibility of
retaining the forbearance component of DACA, nor did she make
efforts to accommodate Dreamers’ reliance interests.226 Thus, this
rescission could not stand.227
3. Were Dreamers’ Lives, Liberty, or Property at Stake?
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts had to address Respondents’
contention that the rescission of DACA violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.228 He swiftly rejected
was required to assess whether there were reliance interests, determine
whether they were significant and weigh any such interests against competing
policy concerns.”).
222. Id. at 1914 (“Acting Secretary Duke authorized DHS to process twoyear renewals for those DACA recipients whose benefits were set to expire
within six months.”).
223. Id.; Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 94 (“Recognizing
the complexities associated with winding down the program, the Department
will provide a limited window in which it will adjudicate certain requests for
DACA[.]”).
224. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1914-15.
Had Duke considered reliance interests, she might, for example, have
considered a broader renewal period based on the need for DACA
recipients to reorder their affairs. Alternatively, Duke might have
considered more accommodating termination dates for recipients caught
in the middle of a time-bounded commitment, to allow them to, say,
graduate from their course of study, complete their military service, or
finish a medical treatment regimen. Or she might have instructed
immigration officials to give salient weight to any reliance interests
engendered by DACA when exercising individualized enforcement
discretion.
225. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2021) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]”).
226. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1915.
227. Id.
228. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V; Equal Protection, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection [perma.cc/8LZV-BE3V] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2021). “[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. V. “The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the United States government to
practice equal protection . . . Equal protection forces [the government to act]
impartially – not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.” Equal Protection,
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this argument due to Respondents’ failure to meet the elements of
an equal protection claim.229 Respondents asserted that this
rescission would disproportionately affect Latinos from Mexico
because seventy-eight percent of Dreamers are Mexican.230
Nevertheless, the Court found this argument ineffective.231 Given
that Latinos make up the vast majority of America’s undocumented
immigrants, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that any “cross-cutting
immigration relief program” would have a disproportionate effect
on this demographic.232
Respondents went on to argue the rescission of DACA had an
unusual history, and certain “pre- and post-election statements
made by President Trump” demonstrated the administration’s
discriminatory intent.233 The Court was not convinced by these
arguments either.234 Despite DHS reaffirming DACA merely three
months prior to its rescission, Chief Justice Roberts found nothing
irregular in the months preceding the Duke Memorandum.235 After
the Fifth Circuit determined DAPA was void because of the benefits
it conferred, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that Attorney General
Sessions and DHS were merely responding in a natural way to a
“newly identified problem.”236 Moreover, given that Attorney
General Sessions and Duke were the relevant actors in the decision
to rescind DACA, any statements made by the President were
unilluminating because they were “remote in time and made in
unrelated contexts.”237 Furthermore, Respondents were unable to
“identif[y] statements by [either Attorney General Sessions or
Duke] that would give rise to an inference of discriminatory
motive.”238 Respondents’ inability to prove “an ‘invidious
discriminatory purpose’” behind the rescission of DACA meant that
their equal protection claim must fail.239
supra.
229. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1915.
[E]ven if the claim is cognizable, the allegations here are insufficient. To
plead animus, a plaintiff must raise a plausible inference that an
‘invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor’ in the
relevant decision . . . Possible evidence includes disparate impact on a
particular group, ‘[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,’
and ‘contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.’
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1916.
235. Id.
236. Id. (“The DAPA memo did not address the merits of the DACA policy
or its legality. Thus, when the Attorney General later determined that DACA
shared DAPA’s legal defects, DHS’s decision to reevaluate DACA was not a
‘strange about-face’ . . . It was a natural response to a newly identified
problem.”).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1915-16.
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Taken in its entirety, Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion
reads like a playbook on how DHS could go about rescinding DACA
“the right way” in the future. While he prevented the rescission in
the immediate, he gave detailed examples of what DHS should have
considered, what it should have included in its rescission
memorandum, and ways in which it could legally wind-down the
program.240 DHS could, at any point, refer back to this plurality
opinion to create a new rescission memorandum that ticks all the
boxes Chief Justice Roberts laid out. DACA lives to fight another
day, but its days might be numbered after this decision.

B. Justice Sotomayor: It’s Too Early to Squash an
Equal Protection Claim
While Justice Sotomayor concurred with the plurality that
DHS violated the APA because the Duke Memorandum was
arbitrary and capricious, she dissented against their equal
protection conclusion.241 She believed that Respondents had met the
threshold requirements and their “complaints create[d] more than
a ‘sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’”242
Instead of dismissing their equal protection claim, Justice
Sotomayor would have remanded the issue for further factual
development.243
Justice Sotomayor began by pointing out some of the
declarations made by President Trump against Mexicans.244 Both
before and after he assumed office, President Trump referred to
Mexican immigrants as “people [with] lots of problems,” “the bad
ones,” “animals,” and “criminals, drug dealers, [and] rapists.”245
Justice Sotomayor found it relevant that these comments were
made regarding “unlawful migration from Mexico – a keystone of
President Trump’s campaign and a policy priority of his
administration.”246 She said these statements, taken as a whole,
240. See id. at 1907-17 (detailing the reliance issues DHS should have
considered, the different ways it could have wound down the program, and
accepting DHS’s concerns as valid reasons for rescinding the program).
241. Id. at 1916-17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
242. Id. at 1918 (quoting in part Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
243. Id. at 1917-18.
244. Id. at 1917.
245. Id.; Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico,
TIME (Aug. 31, 2016), www.time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meetinginsult/ [perma.cc/C5Q2-JHZA]. “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not
sending their best . . . They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and
they’re bringing those problems with [them]. They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists.” Reilly, supra.
246. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part); James Cooper, The United States, Mexico, and the War on
Drugs in the Trump Administration, 25 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES.
234, 235 (2018). “[A] great deal of Mr. Trump’s Presidential campaign was
focused around the relationship the United States has with its southern
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“create[d] a strong perception” that the rescission of DACA was
“contaminated by impermissible discriminatory animus.”247 Justice
Sotomayor argued that President Trump’s statements acted as a
backdrop to his administration’s treatment of immigrants,
especially immigrants from Mexico.248 Accordingly, she asserted the
rescission of DACA could not be disentangled from President
Trump’s statements and the Court should have considered them as
a probable motivating factor in DHS’s decision to rescind DACA.249
The majority of Dreamers impacted by the rescission are the
very same demographic of immigrants President Trump had
repeatedly attacked.250 Given this line of reasoning, Justice
Sotomayor said there was something suspicious about DHS’s
decision to rescind DACA a mere three months after it had
reaffirmed its commitment to the program.251 Thus, she would have
remanded this issue for further factual development to determine
whether DHS violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.252
Justice Sotomayor made a valid point. It is difficult to imagine
how statements made by a sitting President against the very
population most impacted by the rescission of DACA could not have
a significant impact on DHS’s ultimate decision. After all, as a
member of the executive branch, DHS answers to the President.253
The Court should have allowed Respondents to develop their theory
by granting them an opportunity for further discovery.

neighbor and on the border that the two countries share.” Cooper, supra.
247. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part).
248. Id. at 1918; Cooper, supra note 246, at 236. “[T]he impact of the policy
decision must be viewed in the context of the President’s public statements on
and off the campaign trail.” Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1917.
“During his campaign, Mr. Trump promised to create a deportation force to
remove the estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants . . . According
to the President, many of these undocumented immigrants are rapists and drug
dealers, and he often refers to them as ‘bad hombres.’’’ Cooper, supra note 246.
249. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1917-18 (“[T]he plurality
minimizes the disproportionate impact of the rescission decision on Latinos[.]”).
250. Id. at 1918 (“I would not so readily dismiss the allegation that an
executive decision disproportionately harms the same racial group that the
President branded as less desirable mere months earlier.”).
251. Id. at 1917 (quoting in part Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551,
2575 (2019)) (“The abrupt change in position . . . raises the possibility of a
‘significant mismatch between the decision . . . made and the rational . . .
provided.’”).
252. Id. at 1918 (quoting in part Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (“The facts in
[R]espondents’ complaints create more than a ‘sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.’ . . . Whether they ultimately amount to actionable
discrimination should be determined only after factual development on
remand.”).
253.
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland
Security,
USAGOV,
www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/u-s-department-of-homeland-security
[perma.cc/NAL5-EMRF ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
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C. Justice Thomas: There’s No Need to Look Any
Further Than DACA’s Own Illegality
Justice Thomas wrote a fairly scathing opinion in which he
concurred with the plurality’s judgment but dissented against their
overall review of the DACA program.254 The crux of Justice
Thomas’s argument was that DACA was enacted illegally, thus it is
an illegal program that DHS was not required to renew.255 He said
the Court should have limited its inquiry to whether DHS’s
determination of illegality was sound.256 Justice Thomas argued
that the plurality opinion forces presidential administrations to
maintain “unlawful programs” implemented by previous
administrations.257
Justice Thomas began by asserting that “‘an agency literally
has no power to act. . . unless and until Congress confers power upon
it’”258 If an agency exceeds this authority, then it has acted
unlawfully.259 He pointed out that Congress never gave DHS the
authority to create new immigration classes or grant widespread
relief from removal– which is, in fact, what DACA did.260 Justice
Thomas argued that in creating and implementing DACA, DHS
altered the way in which the laws apply to a large group of
undocumented immigrants because the INA explains that people
who have entered the United States without inspection or who have
overstayed their visas must be removed from the country.261
“Instead of merely refusing to enforce the INA’s removal laws
against an individual, the DHS has enacted a wide-reaching
254. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1918-31 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
255. Id. at 1918-19, 1922 (“Without any purported delegation of authority
from Congress and without undertaking a rulemaking, DHS [under President
Obama] unilaterally created a program known as . . . DACA . . . [T]he program
was unlawful from its inception.”). Id. at 1918-19. (“The decision to rescind an
unlawful agency action is per se lawful.”). Id. at 1922.
256. Id. at 1919.
257. Id.
[T]he majority’s holding creates perverse incentives, particularly for
outgoing administrations. Under the auspices of today’s decision,
administrations can bind its successors by unlawfully adopting
significant legal changes through [e]xecutive [b]ranch agency
memoranda . . . [T]he majority erroneously holds that the agency is not
only permitted, but required, to continue administering unlawful
programs that it inherited from a previous administration.
258. Id. at 1921 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting in part Arlington
v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 317 (2013)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1922.
261. Id. (quoting Texas v. United States, 328 F.Supp.3d 662, 713 (S.D. Tex.
2018)) (“DACA [recipients] primarily entered the country either by overstaying
a visa or by entering without inspection, and the INA instructs that aliens in
both classes are removeable.”).
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program that awards legal presence . . . to individuals Congress has
deemed deportable or removable.”262 If Congress wanted to grant an
exception for Dreamers, it very well could have; if it wanted to
delegate this authority to DHS, it could have, but because Congress
did not, DHS could not act on its own volition.263 Justice Thomas
asserted that DHS acted unlawfully in issuing the DACA
Memorandum and in building out procedures to enact the DACA
program.264
Justice Thomas then took issue with the plurality’s analysis of
the rescission under the APA.265 From his perspective, the Court’s
analysis should begin and end with DACA’s illegality.266 Not only
did the DACA Memorandum “flout[] the APA’s procedural
requirements,”267 its continued enforcement means that “every
action taken by DHS under DACA is [an] unlawful exercise of
power.”268 By announcing that DACA was illegal, DHS had met the
requirements under the APA and sufficiently explained its
action.269 Justice Thomas brushed the reliance interests aside as
irrelevant since DHS never had the statutory authority to create
DACA in the first place.270 He argued that requiring DHS to give

262. Id. at 1925 (quoting Texas, 86 F.Supp.3d at 654).
263. Id. at 1922.
Congress clearly knows how to provide for classwide deferred action
when it wishes to do so. On multiple occasions, Congress has used
express language to make certain classes of individuals eligible for
deferred action . . . Congress has failed to provide similar explicit
provisions for DACA recipients, and the immigration laws contain no
indication that DHS can, at will, create its own categorical policies for
deferred action.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1926.
266. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1926 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (“DHS has no authority here to create DACA, and the
unlawfulness of that program is a sufficient justification for its rescission.”).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1926-28.
Because DACA has the force and effect of law, DHS was required to
observe the procedures set out in the APA if it wanted to promulgate a
legislative rule. It is undisputed . . . that DHS did not do so. It provided
no opportunity for interested parties to submit comments regarding the
effect that the program’s dramatic and very significant change in
immigration law would have on various aspects of society. It provided no
discussion of economic considerations or national security interests. Nor
did it provide any substantial policy justifications for treating young
people brought to this country differently from other classes of aliens
who have lived in the country without incident for many years. And, it
did not invoke any law authorizing DHS to create such a program beyond
its inexplicable assertion that DACA was consistent with existing law.
Because DHS failed to engage in the statutorily mandated process,
DACA never gained status as a legally binding regulation that could
impose duties or obligations on third parties.
269. Id. at 1928.
270. Id. at 1930.
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additional policy reasons for rescinding DACA and further
consideration to reliance interests was not only illogical, but was
not grounded in precedent and violated the separation of powers.271
While Justice Thomas made some valid points and his
arguments sound compelling, he ultimately misconstrued the
plurality’s holding. DACA was indeed created unilaterally and
without Congressional legislation or rulemaking.272 However,
DACA’s overall legality was not at issue in this case – the Court
explicitly stated that it would not be addressing this issue.273
Instead, what was under consideration were the actions taken by
DHS after Attorney General Sessions concluded that DACA’s
benefits violated the INA.274
Justice Thomas was wrong in his interpretation of the reliance
interests at stake. In dismissing these interests, he disregarded the
reality of the situation. Irrespective of whether DACA was enacted
legally or illegally, hundreds of thousands of people have organized
their lives around this ongoing program.275 These interests and the
consequences of rescinding DACA should have been considered by
DHS. Even if a program was not enacted through the normal
channels of lawmaking, it should not mean the rescission of the
same program may also be allowed to fall outside the law. If DHS
were permitted to act in violation of the APA and rescind DACA
without considering these reliance interests, it would set a
dangerous precedent of allowing agencies to circumvent the law
meant to restrain them.

271. Id. at 1926 (quoting in part Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536
(2007).
This rule ‘has no basis in our jurisprudence.’ . . . No court can compel
[e]xecutive [b]ranch officials to exceed their congressionally delegated
powers by continuing a program that was void [from the beginning] . . .
In reviewing agency action, our role is to ensure that [e]xecutive [b]ranch
officials do not transgress the proper bounds of their authority, . . . not
to perpetuate a decision to unlawfully wield power in direct
contravention of the enabling statute’s clear limits.
272. See Xiao Ming Hu, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and
Prosecutorial Discretion: Legality, Policy, and Foreign Comparison, 23 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27 (2014) (describing how DACA came into existence
through executive action and the legal defects DACA suffers from because it did
not go through the channels of bicamerialism and presentment); Susan B.
Dussault, Who Needs DACA or the DREAM Act? How the Ordinary Use of
Executive Discretion Can Help (Some) Childhood Arrivals Become Citizens, 22
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 441 (2018).
273. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910.
274. Id. at 1905; Letter from Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III,
supra note 96.
275. See generally Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11-21, Dep’t of Homeland
Security v. Regents of the Univ. of California 140 S. Ct. (1891) (2020), Trump v.
NAACP, McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, 18-589) (providing
support for why DHS was required to consider Dreamers’ reliance interests and
what those reliance interests were).
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Moreover, contrary to Justice Thomas’s understanding, the
plurality’s decision does not force new administrations to maintain
unlawful programs. The plurality agreed that it is within DHS’s
authority to end the program.276 At the core of the plurality’s
decision is the mandate that when rescinding a program such as
DACA, DHS must abide by the procedures set out in the APA.277 So
long as an administrative agency follows these procedures, it can
terminate a previous administration’s programs.278

D. Justice Alito: “Our constitutional system is not
supposed to work [this] way.”279
Justice Alito’s brief opinion in which he concurred in the
judgment but dissented in part, centers around the role of the
Federal Judiciary as it relates to DACA.280 He saw DACA as a
political quagmire, one in which the courts should not be
involved.281 Despite this, Justice Alito noted that the rescission of
DACA had been the subject of litigation for most of President
Trump’s term in office.282 Through this litigious process, a duly
elected President was unable to follow through on one of his policy
objectives – namely, rescinding DACA.283
Justice Alito goes on to echo Justice Thomas’s opinion that
DACA was illegal from the get-go, and this fact, in and of itself, is
sufficient to justify DHS’s termination of the program.284 Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that DACA was lawful, Justice Alito
claimed the Court had no rational basis for overturning DHS’s
recission.285 From his perspective, DACA could be seen as a “lawful

276. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1905 (“The dispute
before the Court is not whether DHS may rescind DACA. All parties agree that
it may.”).
277. See id. at 1916 (finding DHS failed to provide a reasoned explanation
for rescinding DACA because it did not consider Dreamers’ reliance interests or
the possibility of retaining the forbearance component of DACA).
278. See id. (remanding the issue to DHS so that they may consider the
possibility of rescinding DACA again).
279. Id. at 1932 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (“Early in [President Trump’s term in office], his administration
took the controversial step of attempting to rescind the . . . DACA program.
Shortly thereafter, one of the nearly 700 federal district court judges blocked
this rescission, and since then, the issue has been mired in litigation.”).
283. Id. (“[T]oday, the Court still does not resolve the question of DACA’s
rescission. Instead, it tells the [DHS] to go back and try again. What this means
is that the Federal Judiciary, without holding that DACA cannot be rescinded,
has prevented that from occurring during an entire Presidential term.”).
284. Id. (“DACA was unlawful from the start, and that alone is sufficient to
justify its termination.”).
285. Id.
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exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”286 Therefore, its rescission
would be of the same character.287 Accordingly, such agency
discretion would be unreviewable by the courts under section
701(a)(2) of the APA.288 He further posited that even if the rescission
of DACA was reviewable, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious.289
Therefore, Justice Alito implies he would have upheld the Duke
Memorandum as adequate because it provided sufficient
consideration to avoid being arbitrary and capricious.290
Justice Alito’s lamentation over the fact that a duly elected
President was unable to achieve one of their policy objectives seems
out of touch. Since Justice Alito joined the Supreme Court in 2006,
not a single U.S. President has been able to follow through on 100
percent of their policy goals.291

E. Justice Kavanaugh: The Nielsen Memorandum
Should Have Been Considered in The Plurality’s
Decision.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a partial concurrence in which his
principal argument was that the Court misapplied the rule
regarding post hoc rationalizations and the Nielsen Memorandum
should have been considered in their decision.292 He reasoned that
had the Nielsen Memorandum been considered by the Court, it
would have resolved the Court’s issues with the Duke
Memorandum.293
Justice Kavanaugh contends that the post hoc rationalization
doctrine was misapplied by the plurality.294 The appropriate
application of this doctrine prevents courts from “uphold[ing]
agency action on the basis of rationales offered by anyone other than
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2021) (“This chapter applies, according to the
provisions thereof, except to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.”).
289. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1932 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part).
290. Id.
291. See Elaine C. Kamarck, Why Presidents Fail And How They Can
Succeed Again 2, 4-6 (Brookings Institution Press 2016) (explaining how
modern presidents struggle to achieve their policy objectives because they
misjudge their ability to persuade the public into supporting their goals, twentyfirst century politics have become hyper-polarized, and presidents tend to spend
too much time talking to the public and campaigning when instead they should
focus on government management in order to achieve their objectives),
292. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1932-35 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part).
293. Id. at 1933.
294. See id. at 1934 (describing the Nielsen Memorandum as similar to other
forms of agency action that offer supplemental explanation and are commonly
considered by courts).
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the proper decisionmakers.”295 Additionally, the post hoc
rationalization doctrine does not prevent agencies from providing
further explanation for their reasoning after an initial decision has
been made.296 As the Secretary of DHS, Nielsen was a proper
decisionmaker and her memorandum provided further explanation
for the initial rescission.297 Justice Kavanaugh felt that “[u]nder
ordinary application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the
Nielsen Memorandum—with its alternative and independent
rationales and its discussion of reliance—would pass muster as an
explanation for the [e]xecutive [b]ranch’s action.”298
Justice Kavanaugh is right. Nielsen would be an appropriate
agency decisionmaker with the authority to address and provide
further explanation for DHS’s reasons for rescinding DACA. He is
also correct in finding that Nielsen provided further detail about the
decision to rescind DACA and addressed issues of reliance.299 He is
also likely correct in assuming the Nielsen Memorandum would
meet the APA requirements, and therefore the rescission would not
be arbitrary and capricious.
However, there is a fine line between providing further
explanation and providing additional reasons. The Duke
Memorandum gave only two reasons for rescinding DACA: the
ruling in Texas v. United States, finding DAPA violated the INA and
APA,300 and the letter from Attorney General Sessions suggesting
that DACA suffered from the same legal defects as DAPA.301 In
contrast, Nielsen gave three additional reasons which were never
mentioned in the Duke Memorandum.302 Nielsen’s job, as ordered
by the D.C. District Court, was to dive deeper into the two original
reasons given by Duke.303 She did not do this. Even Justice
Kavanaugh’s own understanding of the post hoc rationalization
295. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6
(2006)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1933-34.
298. Id. at 1933 (“[T]he Nielsen Memorandum more fully explained the
Department’s legal reasons for rescinding DACA, and clarified that even if
DACA were lawful, the Department would still rescind DACA for a variety of
policy reasons. The Nielsen Memorandum also expressly addressed the reliance
interests of DACA recipients.”).
299. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104.
300. See Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (holding DAPA violated the procedural
requirements of the APA section 553 and would impermissibly grant
immigration relief to a large group of undocumented immigrants).
301. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 94.
302. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104.
First, . . . the DACA policy was contrary to law . . . Second, regardless of
whether the DACA policy is ultimately illegal, it was appropriately
rescinded by DHS because there are, at a minimum, serious doubts
about its legality . . . Third, regardless of whether these concerns about
the DACA policy render it illegal or legally questionable, there are sound
reasons of enforcement policy to rescind the DACA policy.
303. NAACP, 298 F.Supp.3d at 245.
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doctrine could not help Nielsen because she was not elaborating on
Duke’s initial reasoning – she was providing additional reasons to
support the rescission.304 In doing this, Nielsen was trying to stack
the odds in DHS’s favor. Nielsen’s reasons may have some validity
to them, which is likely why Justice Kavanaugh felt the Nielsen
Memorandum “would pass muster.”305 However, they were not the
explanations given in the Duke Memorandum, and as such, the
Court could not take them into consideration.306 Nielsen was given
explicit instructions by the D.C. District Court: to expand upon
Duke’s initial reasoning for rescinding DACA. She was not allowed
to provide additional reasons that were not considered or offered by
Duke in her memorandum. Nielsen failed to follow this directive
and this mistake meant that her memorandum would not be
considered by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps DHS would have been able to successfully terminate
DACA had Nielsen written the initial rescission memorandum.
However, this is not the reality of the situation. Instead, the Court
decided DHS must be held to its initial reasoning given in the Duke
Memorandum and it must deal with the consequences of providing
post hoc rationalizations.307

IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
If there is one thing to take away from the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Regents, it is that DACA is not safe in its current form.
What is also clear from this decision is that the only way to protect
Dreamers and DACA is through a congressionally passed law. In
this section, a feasible, long-term solution to this problem will be
offered; a solution that will not only help Dreamers today but will
protect future Dreamers as well.
Since DACA’s inception in 2012, the program has generally
garnered wide-spread public support.308 Arguably, Congress has
304. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 104.
305. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1933.
306. See id. at 1909-10 (finding “[Nielsen’s statements] can be viewed only
as impermissible post hoc rationalizations and thus are not properly before us .
. . This is not the case for cutting corners to allow DHS to rely upon reasons
absent from its original decision.”).
307. Id.
308. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19; Jens Manuel
Krogstad, Americans Broadly Support Legal Status for Immigrants Brought to
the U.S. Illegally as Children, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 17, 2020),
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/17/americans-broadly-support-legalstatus-for-immigrants-brought-to-the-u-s-illegally-as-children/
[perma.cc/TP42-2XP6]; Anita Kumar, Poll: Trump Voters Want to Protect
Dreamers,
POLITICO
(June
17,
2020),
www.politico.com/news/2020/06/17/trump-supporters-dreamers-poll-323432
[perma.cc/W8HH-ZYJ4]. According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research
Center in the summer of 2020, seventy-four percent of Americans would
approve of a law which grants permanent legal status to those who came to the
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given its implied approval to DACA since it has yet to usher through
a law which would render the program unnecessary. 309 While
members of Congress have brought forward at least four different
statutes that attempt to address the issue of illegal childhood
arrivals, none have succeeded.310 However, there is no real need for
Congress to reinvent the wheel because an answer has already been
established.
Codifying DACA in its current form, with certain alterations
and additions, would resolve the issues presented in Regents. The
DACA Memorandum lays out the precise criteria required to be
eligible for deferred action and work authorization.311 Additionally,
USCIS, ICE, and CBP have established and utilized processes
which align with the DACA Memorandum, and these processes
have, by and large, worked.312 Why fix what is not broken?313

United States as children. Krogstad, supra. Ninety-one percent of Democrats
favor this initiative; fifty-four percent of Republicans have said they would be
in favor of such a law. Id. Also, according to a POLITICO/Morning Consult poll,
sixty-nine percent of those who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential
election believe that Dreamers should be protected. Id.
309. Utah Ass’n of Cntys. v. Clinton, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15852, * 37 (D.
Utah 1999). Congress can ratify official government action through “a group of
indirect congressional actions.” Id.
310. American Hope Act of 2017, H.R. 3591, 115th Cong. (2017); Bar
Removal of Individuals who Dream and Grow our Economy (BRIDGE) Act, H.R.
496, 115th Cong. (2017); Dream Act of 2017, S. 1615, 115th Cong. (2017);
Recognizing America’s Children Act, H.R. 1468, 115th Cong. (2017).
311. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
The following criteria should be satisfied before an individual is
considered for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion pursuant to this
memorandum: came to the United States under the age of sixteen; has
continuously resided in the United States for a[t] least five years
preceding the date of this memorandum and is present in the United
States on the date of this memorandum; is currently in school, has
graduated from high school, has obtained a general education
development certificate, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the
Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; has not been
convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple
misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to national security
or public safety; and is not above the age of thirty.
312. DACA Population Receipts Since Injunction June 30, 2020, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS.
(Nov.
16,
2020),
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/DACA_Population_Receipt
s_since_Injunction_Jun_30_2020.pdf [perma.cc/Q4V4-66NC].
313. Of course, this note is aiming to fix what is broken within the system,
namely that there is no long-term, guaranteed protection for Dreamers.
However, the program as a whole has worked as a means of granting childhood
arrivals some peace of mind and the ability to actively engage in our society
without having to constantly be looking over their shoulder, worried they may
be deported.
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A. How DACA Compares to Other Forms of
Immigration Relief
By granting deferred action under DACA, DHS is exercising its
prosecutorial discretion over who will be deported and who can
remain in the United States.314 Typical instances of prosecutorial
discretion consider various factors when deciding whether to take
action against an undocumented immigrant.315 The immigrant in
this case does not have the opportunity to petition for their own
benefit, unlike Dreamers under DACA.316 DACA is unique from
other forms of prosecutorial discretion because it asks applicants to
get involved in the decision-making process.317 In this sense, the
method of applying for and receiving deferred action and work
authorization under DACA mirrors the process of applying for other
types of affirmative immigration relief.318
To qualify for relief under DACA, the applicant must
affirmatively engage with our immigration system by filing an
application and paying a processing fee to USCIS.319 USCIS then
reviews the application to ensure the applicant meets all of the
requirements under DACA and uses its discretion to grant deferred
action and work authorization.320 Compare this to the process for

314. See Hu, supra note 272 (describing how prosecutorial discretion is used
to grant deferred action for Dreamers); Memorandum from Doris Messner,
supra note 138.
‘Prosecutorial discretion’ is the authority of an agency charged with
enforcing a law to decide whether to enforce, or not to enforce, the law
against someone . . . In the immigration context, the term applies not
only to the decision to issue, serve, or file a Notice to Appear . . . but also
to a broad range of other discretionary enforcement decisions, including
. . . granting deferred action[.]
315. Id. Some of the factors considered when deciding whether to exercise
prosecutiorial discretion include: the individual’s immigration status and
history, their criminal history and length of residence in America, potential
humanitarian concerns resulting from removal, the likelihood of successfully
removing the individual or achieving other enforcement mechanisms against
them, whether the individual is likely to become eligible for immigration relief
in the future, the effect that removal would have on their future admissibility,
whether the individual has cooperated with law enforcement, DHS’s available
resources, the level of community attention, and whether the individual has
honorably served in the U.S. military or Coast Guard. Id.
316. Id.
317. Hu, supra note 272, at 29 (“DACA is the first exercise of prosecutorial
discretion that allows aliens to directly apply for deferred action before they are
subject to removal proceedings.”).
318. Id. at 32 (“Individuals who meet the criteria can apply for deferred
action by filing a form I-821D. Individuals can also file a form I-765 to apply for
employment authorization. The USCIS has also stated that it will not waive the
$465 application fee.”).
319. Id. at 41, 50-51.
320. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra
note 46.
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receiving a J-1 visa,321 where an individual also affirmatively
engages with USCIS by filing an application and paying a
processing fee.322 Just like under DACA, USCIS reviews the J-1
application to ensure the applicant meets the requirements and
then uses its discretion to grant immigration status and work
authorization.323 The principal difference between the
administration of the J-1 visa and DACA is that Congress has
codified the process for obtaining a J-1 visa but has failed to codify
DACA. DACA is already functioning like other affirmative
immigration programs – it just needs to be formalized by Congress.

B. Transforming DACA Into Statutory Law
If Congress were to pass a law codifying the DACA program,
the possibility of DACA being rescinded by a future administration
would be eliminated. The Court in Regents specifically chose not to
address the legality of DACA324 and it openly admitted that DHS is
authorized to rescind the program at its discretion.325 If DACA were
passed into law then its overall legality would no longer be in
question because it would have gone through the appropriate
channels of bicameralism and presentment.326 Additionally, DHS
would have no authority to rescind the program because only the
United States Supreme Court has the authority to invalidate laws
that violate the federal Constitution.327 This would grant current

321. J-1 Visa Basics, BRIDGEUSA, www.j1visa.state.gov/ [perma.cc/DV2KRYHB] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021); Working in the United States, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states
[perma.cc/7JL2-XEKF] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021). The J-1 visa is a nonimmigrant visa category with a relatively broad application. J-1 Visa Basics,
supra. Under this visa category, an individual can come to the United States
and live, study, and work here for up to four years. Id. Those eligible for this
visa range from foreign physicians, au pairs, camp counsellors, trainees and
interns, teachers, students seeking secondary education, and summer work
travel. Id. Additionally, under this category, an individual has the opportunity
to apply for subsequent visa categories (so long as they qualify) which can place
them on a path towards permanent residency, which can ultimately lead to
citizenship. Working in the United States, supra.
322. Exchange Visitors, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/students-and-exchangevisitors/exchange-visitors [perma.cc/W5MB-TU8K ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
323. Id.
324. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. at 1910.
325. Id. at 1905 (“The dispute before the Court is not whether DHS may
rescind DACA. All parties agree that it may.”).
326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States . . . Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary . . . shall be presented to the President of the United States.
327. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
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and future Dreamers some peace of mind by allowing them to live
their lives without fear that they could have their status ripped out
from under them at any moment.
Congress’s job, to some degree, has already been done for them
because the DACA Memorandum, and the procedures built out by
DHS in response to it, have already done a lot of the heavy lifting.
Congress could easily take the criteria and procedures already in
place and replicate them into a formal immigration statute.
However, some important additions and alterations would need to
be made for a DACA statute to appease both Democrats and
Republicans, and account for both current and future Dreamers.
One issue with the current DACA Memorandum is that an
individual must “ha[ve] continuously resided in the United States
for at least five years preceding the date of [the] memorandum and
is present in the United States on the date of [the] memorandum.”328
This means that for someone to qualify for DACA, they had to be in
the United States on June 15, 2012, and must have been
continuously residing in the U.S. since at least June 15, 2007.329
This creates a major problem for any child who was, or will be,
brought into this country illegally after the issuance of the DACA
Memorandum because it means they cannot apply for deferred
action under DACA. Given America’s history as an immigrant
nation and the fact that many people seek a better life in the United
States,330 the likelihood that illegal child migration will come to an
end is unrealistic.
To address the issue of illegal child migration, America needs
to develop a long-term solution that is not contingent upon the child
being in the United States on a given date. Congress can, and
should, include a provision in the proposed DACA statute that
requires all applicants to maintain continual residence in the U.S.
to prove they are committed to living in America long-term, e.g., five
years. However, they should avoid tying this timeframe to any given
date (such as, for example, the date on which Congress would pass
the statute into law). By avoiding a date-specific timeframe,
Congress would allow the nation to address child migration for the
foreseeable future. Unless some breakdown in the process begins to
evolve, the U.S. could rest assured knowing that undocumented
child migrants are being protected by our immigration system.
Another major drawback of the current DACA program is that

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
328. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
329. Id.
330. See Budiman, supra note 13 (providing data to show the number of
immigrants in the United States, how this number has changed over time,
where immigrants are coming from, how many obtain U.S. citizenship,
generally where most immigrants live in America, and how many work and get
an education in the U.S.); Mossaad, supra note 15.
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Dreamers have no pathway to citizenship.331 In other words,
Dreamers currently have no hope of becoming permanent residents
of the country they call home. Any law passed by Congress
pertaining to Dreamers and DACA absolutely must include some
pathway to citizenship. Otherwise, the problems facing Dreamers
(principally, that their deferred action may be revoked at any time,
and they could be deported) will not truly be resolved and
Americans will have to continuously revisit this subject.
Admittedly, granting citizenship to undocumented migrants is
likely to be the most contentious aspect of any future DACA
statute.332 Some members of Congress, such as Texas’s former
Republican Representative Lamar Smith, and Virginia’s former
Republican Congressman Bob Goodlatte, have argued that granting
amnesty to Dreamers would only “encourage[] more illegal
immigration and contribute[] to the surge of unaccompanied minors
and families seeking to enter the U.S. illegally.”333 However,
creating a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers will not only save
time and money for ICE334 and USCIS but will generate billions of
dollars towards the United States’ gross domestic product.335 ICE
only has the resources to deport 400,000 undocumented immigrants
per year336 and USCIS receives millions of applications every
year.337 Creating a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers would
331. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19 (“This
memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to
citizenship.”).
332. See Republicanviews, Republican Views On DACA (Dec. 31, 2018)
www.republicanviews.org/republican-views-on-daca/ [ https://perma.cc/V2J9378W] (explaining that DACA is a highly contentious issue within the
Republican party because it deals with the issue of illegal immigration, which
most Republicans are firmly against).
333. Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte Statement on Ending Executive Overreach on
Immigration, HOUSE OF REP. JUDICIARY COMM. (Sept. 5, 2017), republicansjudiciary.house.gov/press-release/goodlatte-statement-ending-executiveoverreach-immigration/ [perma.cc/D7XD-7PEA]; Are DACA and the DREAM
Act Good for America?, supra note 24.
334. Hu, supra note 272 at 38 (“ICE ‘only has the resources to remove . . .
less than [four] percent of the estimated illegal alien population in the United
States.’ As a result, ICE has to prioritize the use of its resources for
enforcement, detention, and removal.”).
335. Are DACA and the DREAM Act Good for America?, supra note 24.
“DACA recipients will ‘contribute $460.3 billion to the U.S. gross domestic
product [GDP] over the next decade – economic growth that would be lost were
DACA to be eliminated. Id. Additionally, if an act were to be passed addressing
Dreamers, “it would add $22.7 billion annually to the US GDP, and up to $400
billion over the next decade.” Id.
336. Hu, supra note 272, at 38.
337. USCIS Final FY 2019 Statistics Available, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Jan. 16, 2020) www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-final-fy-2019-statisticsavailable [perma.cc/FX3T-632F]; DACA Population Receipts Since Injunction
June 30, 2020, supra note 312. In 2019 alone, USCIS processed more than 40
million applications and received around 2.2 million applications for work
authorization. USCIS Final FY 2019 Statistics Available, supra. Additionally,
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minimize some of the work ICE and USCIS have to do because
fewer Dreamers would be regularly applying for renewals, and
deportations would decrease. ICE could then focus its limited
resources on deporting those who pose a threat to national security
and public safety.338
Furthermore, to qualify for deferred action under DACA,
applicants must essentially be upstanding individuals and
maintain this status for USCIS to renew their two-year forbearance
from deportation.339 Dreamers cannot be felons or have multiple
misdemeanors, they must either be currently enrolled in school or
graduated from high school, or they must be honorably discharged
members of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces.340 In other words,
Dreamers are educated, hardworking, productive, patriotic, and
brave members of our communities. Why would we want to deport
these types of individuals? Congress has the ability and the
opportunity to pass a law that would protect these people and
acknowledge the impact and benefit Dreamers have had, and will
continue to have, on our nation.
In a proposed DACA statute, Congress could easily maintain
these “upstanding individual” requirements and institute a “trialrun pipeline” for obtaining permanent residency. Under this
proposed DACA statute, individuals would apply for the same
deferred action and work authorization currently provided under
the DACA program. Instead of a two-year forbearance, however,
Congress should make it a five-year forbearance. During these five
years, Dreamers would need to continually reside in the U.S., pay
their taxes, avoid run-ins with the law, contribute positively to their
communities either through community service, continued
education, enlisting in the military, or continual employment
throughout the full five year “trial-run.” Then, at the end of these
five years, if USCIS is satisfied that the Dreamer has meet all of
these requirements, they would qualify for permanent residency.
Thus, granting Dreamers citizenship to the country they have
positively contributed to and call their home.
While some might argue that America should not reward
people for breaking the law and entering the United States illegally,
the truth of the matter is that these Dreamers “lacked the intent to
violate the law”341 and are “productive young people [who] have

there are currently 27,850 current Dreamers whose two-year forbearance is set
to expire no later than June 2022. DACA Population Receipts Since Injunction
June 30, 2020, supra note 312. What this means, in practical terms, is that
USCIS is staring down the barrel of almost 30,000 applications for renewal in
the next seven months. Id.
338. Memorandum from Doris Messner on Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 138.
339. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 19.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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already contributed to our country in significant ways.”342 A child
should not be punished for their parents’ actions.343 Dreamers really
are the epitome of the American Dream and, as fellow children of
immigrants, Americans should support these individuals and help
them secure their own path to citizenship.

V. CONCLUSION
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.”344 These famous words found in America’s
Declaration of Independence were written by the children of
immigrants and apply to everyone.345 Our country was literally and
figuratively built by immigrants and their descendants – America
would not be the nation it is today without their influence.346
Dreamers are no less important than the immigrants who came to
America in the past. By creating a law that solidifies their status
and leads them down a path towards citizenship, we would be
acknowledging their importance in the fabric of our country.
After the Court’s decision in Regents, DACA lived to fight
another day, but its status remains tenuous. In the Summer of
2020, the Trump Administration made further attempts to roll-back
the program.347 Ultimately, their attempt failed and DACA
remained in place.348 More recently, on July 16, 2021, the Southern
342. Id.
343. Ezekiel 18:19 (“The son will not bear the punishment for the sin of the
father[.]”).
344. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
345. Id.; Matthew Wills, Who Wrote the Declaration of Independence?,
JSTOR DAILY (July 2, 2016), www.daily.jstor.org/who-wrote-the-declarationindependence/ [perma.cc/RM5D-QNWG].
346. Erin Blakemore, These Iconic Figures of American History Were All
Immigrants, TIME (Nov. 12, 2015), www.time.com/4108606/history-americanimmigrants/ [perma.cc/W6NH-CCYL]; Jessica Bush, 10 Famous Immigrants
Who Made America Great, BUZZWORTHY www.buzzworthy.com/10-famousimmigrants-who-changed-america/ [perma.cc/F6HS-BABN] (last visited Sept.
29, 2021).
347. Memorandum from Chad F. Wolf, to Mark Morgan, Matthew Albence,
and Joseph Edlow (July 28, 2020).
348. Priscilla Alvarez, DHS Updates Website to Indicate DACA Program Has
Been Restored, CNN (Dec. 7, 2020), www.cnn.com/2020/12/07/politics/dacarestored-dhs-website/index.html [perma.cc/3Z3Q-WGUR] [hereafter Alvarez I];
Priscilla Alvarez, Federal Judges Tears Into Trump Administration Over its
Handling
of
DACA,
CNN
(Nov.
18,
2020),
www.cnn.com/2020/11/18/politics/daca-garaufis/index.html [perma.cc/3WM884A9] [hereafter Alvarez II]. In November of 2020, Federal Judge Nicholas
Garaufis determined that when Chad Wolf issued the July 2020 Memorandum
limiting renewal requests and new applications for DACA, Wolf was not legally
serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. Alvarez I, supra.
Accordingly, the rules issued by Wolf limiting applications and renewals were
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District of Texas once again weighed in on DACA.349 The Texas
court declared DACA illegal, vacated the DACA Memorandum, and
issued a permanent injunction prohibiting DHS from approving
new applications submitted after July 16, 2021.350 Despite this
holding, DHS can still process renewal applications and associated
requests for work authorization as well as accept initial DACA
applications.351
There is still hope for DACA. DHS and the Department of
Justice can appeal the Southern District of Texas’s decision.
Moreover, after the Supreme Court decided Regents, America
elected a new President, Joseph R. Biden.352 President Biden
“championed the creation and expansion of the . . . DACA program”
and his overall stance on immigration is a far cry from former
President Trump’s immigration policy.353 President Biden has
promised to establish a path to citizenship for Dreamers, and in the
meantime, has promised to keep the current DACA program in
place until a long-term solution is found.354 President Biden’s
political party, the Democrats, holds a majority of the seats in
Congress.355 The 2022 midterms are approaching, however, and 469
seats in Congress will be up for election.356 If Biden wants to pass a
DACA statute, he and the current Congress should act quickly.
Hopefully, President Biden and Congress can look to this note for a
viable, legislative solution to protect current and future Dreamers.
invalid. Alvarez II, supra. In accordance with Judge Garaufis’ orders, DHS was
able to accept new applications for DACA status, renewal applications, and
reinstituted the two-year timeframe for deferred action and work authorization.
Alvarez I, supra.
349. Texas v. United States, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133114 (S.D. Tex. 2021).
350. Id. at 120-21.
351. Additional Information: DACA Decision in State of Texas, et al. v.
United Stated of America, et al., 1:18-CV-00068, (S.D. Texas July 16, 2021)
(“Texas
II”),
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS.,
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhoodarrivals-daca/additional-information-daca-decision-in-state-of-texas-et-al-vunited-states-of-america-et-al-118-cv [perma.cc/4ZKF-ZNTD] (last updated
Aug. 31, 2021).
352.
Presidential
Election,
2020,
BALLOTPEDIA,
www.ballotpedia.org/Presidential_election,_2020 [perma.cc/7DB3-9V8P] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2021).
353. The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants,
BIDEN HARRIS, www.joebiden.com/immigration/ [perma.cc/7LJY-34DE] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2021).
354. Id. (“Dreamers and their parents should have a roadmap to citizenship
through legislative immigration reform. But in the meantime, Biden will
remove the uncertainty for Dreamers by reinstating the DACA program, and
he will explore all legal options to protect their families from inhumane
separation.”).
355. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
[perma.cc/A5W7-F57P] (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
356.
United
States
Congress
elections,
2022,
BALLOTPEDIA,
ballotpedia.org/United_States_Congress_elections,_2022
[https://perma.cc/R628-JZCF] (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).

